Appendix A: Code Examples: Role, Control and Mandate Artefacts
This appendix collects fuller versions of the artefacts that the chapters introduce: the role charter of the security architect, an excerpt from a control catalogue, a containment profile, a mandate manifest for the architect's own agents, the competence framework and a review record for an AI proposal. Every example is identified as NN_CODE_XXX, where NN is the chapter that introduces the artefact. The artefacts are design and governance records kept under version control; in keeping with the book's rules, none of them is attack tooling.
All identifiers refer to the fictional organisations Nordvik Region and Hansa Mutual and are illustrative, and they agree with the profiles in EXAMPLE_ORGANISATIONS.md. Every YAML listing parses as written. The listings below are short skeletons; each is replaced by its full version when the chapter that introduces it is drafted. Appendix B lists every template and tool with the chapter in which it appears.
Index of examples
| Identifier | Chapter | Artefact | Format |
|---|---|---|---|
| 04_CODE_ROLE | 4 | Role charter of the security architect | YAML |
| 09_CODE_CTRL | 9 | Control catalogue excerpt | YAML |
| 07_CODE_CONTAIN | 7 | Containment profile | YAML |
| 13_CODE_MANDATE | 13 | Mandate manifest for an architecture agent team | YAML |
| 21_CODE_COMPETENCE | 21 | Competence framework | YAML |
| 14_CODE_REVIEW | 14 | Review record for an AI proposal | YAML |
04_CODE_ROLE: Role charter
Illustrative artefact; the full version is added when the chapter that introduces it is drafted.
# roles/security-architect.yaml (Nordvik Region, excerpt)
id: ROLE-NR-SA-01
title: Security architect
organisation: Nordvik Region
reports_to: Chief information security officer
commissioned_by: AIDR-0500
mandate: >
Design and verify the security boundaries, identity model, controls,
evidence chain and stop paths of the Region's systems, including those
that suppliers build and operate.
accountabilities:
- Security design of systems in scope, recorded as decision records
- Control catalogue and its mapping to obligations
- Verification of AI-drafted architecture work before approval
version: 1.0.0
effective: 2027-01-01
decision_rights:
decide: [gate_policy_for_catalogue_boundary, stop_path_and_egress_requirements_in_tender_annex, compensating_design_for_exception_up_to_90_days]
veto: [tender_annex_without_stop_path, ai_go_live_without_tested_stop_path] # override by the CISO, on the record
recommend:
- {class: residual_risk_acceptance, decided_by: system_owner}
- {class: changes_to_MND-NR-01, decided_by: chief_information_security_officer}
escalate_to_ciso: [exception_beyond_90_days_or_appetite]
own_ai: {mandate: MND-NR-01, max_level: Level 1 Assisted}
does_not:
- Accept residual risk on behalf of a system owner
- Operate production systems
review: annual
09_CODE_CTRL: Control catalogue excerpt
Illustrative artefact; the full version is added when the chapter that introduces it is drafted.
# controls/catalogue.yaml (Hansa Mutual, excerpt)
- id: CTRL-AGT-002
title: Tool calls outside the permission manifest are denied outside the agent
owner: Head of group AI platform
architect: AI domain security architect
obligations:
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 5.15
- DORA Article 9
- AI Act Article 15
enforcement: policy-as-code
evidence:
source: platform-telemetry
collected_by: evidence-collection agent
freshness_days: 7
test: tests/controls/ctrl_agt_002.rego
status: generated
07_CODE_CONTAIN: Containment profile
Illustrative artefact; the full version is added when the chapter that introduces it is drafted.
# containment/architecture-review-agents.yaml (Hansa Mutual, excerpt)
profile: architecture-review-agents
applies_to: MND-HM-01
identity:
type: workload
credentials: task-scoped
lifetime_minutes: 5 # 15 at first; cut after the stop drill of Chapter 10
egress:
default: deny
allow:
- git.internal.hansa.example
- models.hansa-dc-frankfurt.internal
data:
classification_max: confidential
write: [pull_request_comments]
budget:
max_tool_calls_per_task: 200
stop_path:
owner: Head of security architecture
mechanism: revoke workload identity at the identity provider
13_CODE_MANDATE: Mandate manifest
Illustrative artefact; the full version is added when the chapter that introduces it is drafted.
# mandates/architecture-agent-team.yaml (Hansa Mutual, excerpt)
id: MND-HM-01
owner: Head of security architecture
principle: Agents draft; named architects approve
agents:
- role: reviewer
usage_mode: Mode 3 Agentic work tools
autonomy_level: Level 1 Assisted
may: [comment_on_pull_request]
- role: threat-modeller
usage_mode: Mode 3 Agentic work tools
autonomy_level: Level 1 Assisted
may: [propose_threat_model_change]
- role: evidence-collector
usage_mode: Mode 5 Autonomous production agents
autonomy_level: Level 3 Bounded
may: [refresh_evidence_links]
never:
- merge_to_main
- change_own_mandate
containment_profile: architecture-review-agents
review: quarterly
21_CODE_COMPETENCE: Competence framework
Illustrative artefact; the full version is added when the chapter that introduces it is drafted.
# competence/security-architect-framework.yaml (excerpt)
framework: security-architect
mapped_to:
ecsf: Cybersecurity Architect
domains:
- id: design
levels:
2: Designs a boundary for one system and records the decision
3: Designs boundaries across a domain and verifies them in the pipeline
evidence: [decision_records, merged_policy_changes]
- id: ai
levels:
2: Uses Modes 1 to 3 with verification and records prompts
3: Writes and governs a mandate manifest for an agent team
evidence: [review_records, mandate_manifests]
- id: law
levels:
2: Maps one article to a control with evidence
3: Maintains the article-to-control mapping for a regime
evidence: [catalogue_mappings]
14_CODE_REVIEW: Review record
Illustrative artefact; the full version is added when the chapter that introduces it is drafted.
# reviews/2026/REV-HM-0001.yaml (Hansa Mutual, excerpt)
id: REV-HM-0001
date: 2026-11-02
proposal: pull request changing egress policy for the claims product line
proposed_by: policy-author agent under MND-HM-01
reviewer: Domain security architect, platform and cloud
techniques:
- independent_re_derivation
- tests_as_oracle
- adversarial_second_agent
review_minutes: 35
findings:
- Proposed allow rule broader than the documented supplier endpoint
decision: changes_requested
decision_record: null # the review changed no recorded decision